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STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND (D-SC) ON SENATE FLOOR ON 
VITARELLI CASE, JUNE ¥ 1959. 
Mr. President: 
During the debate on the confirmation of Potter Stewart to 
be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, I pointed out the dangers 
inherent in recent decisions of the Supreme Court/concerning 
Communists and Communist sympathizers. I called attention to the 
fact/that as a result of over-zealous and unwarranted concern/for 
the purported rights of those who look with contempt on our 
republican form of government, a series of recent decisions of the 
Court has, in effect, written a 11 Red Bill of Rights" in the United 
States. As a result of these decisions, I am firmly convinced that 
this country has immeasurably more to fear/from Communist subversion 
within the United States/than it has from armed attack from the 
Soviet Union. To substantiate this conviction, I will refer to 
only a few of the recent pronouncements/or the over-solicitous 
Supreme Court. In the Yates Case, the Court said that anyone may 
advocate the forcible overthrow of our Government with impunity, 
so long as it is in the abstract and there is no time set for overt 
acts. In the Cole and Service cases, it was held that Federal 
employees may freely associate with Communists/without fear of 
discharge/if they hold nonsensitive jobs. Over the protests of 
practically all of the States of the Union, and of the Attorney General 
of the United States, the Supreme Court held invalid all State laws 
concerned with sedition in Pennsylvania Vo Nelson. These are only 
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a few examples/or the Court's utter disregard of legislative intention 
and attendance/to judicial 11nit-p1cking". 
Mr. President, on Monday of this week/the Supreme Court added 
another amendment to the "Red Bill of Rights 11 /by ordering the 
Interior Department/to reinstate an employee it had fired twice in 
the last five years/on the ground that his continued employment was 
contrary to the best interests of national security. As a further 
result of this decision, the Federal Government will be required 
to pay $30,000 in back pay/to one who has been classified as a 
11 security risk", who has been in sympathetic association with 
Communists o'rCommunist sympathizers/and who the courts said had 
lied about such associations before a Federal Loyalty-Security Board 
inquiry. And thus a Department of the Executive Branch of our 
Government/is ordered by the Supreme Court/to reinstate an employee/ 
whom it has already determined is in such close association with 
Communists or Communist sympathizers/that his continued employment 
is inimical to the best interests of our country. Judicial usurpation 
of power by the present Court/2.s not confined to encroachments on the 
legislative branch, but as Vitarelli v. Seaton so well attests, it 
extends to the Executive Branch as well. 
Mr. President, Government employees sought to be dismissed/ 
should be given the benefit of all procedural protections/required 
by applicable statute and regulation. Persons so situated should be 
entitled to be free from dismissal/on unconstitutional or flagrantly 
abusive grounds. But no such dismissal occurred in the Vitarelli Case. 
Vitarelli was at no time within the protection of the Civil Service 
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Act, Veterans• Preference Act, or any other statute relating to 
employment rights of Government employees. This man who had been 
classified as a "security risk11/could have been sununarily discharged 
by the Secretary of the Interior/at any time. The Lloyd-LaFollette 
Act/and the Veterans Preference Act--the general personnel laws-­
authorize dismissals for "such cause as will promote the efficiency 
of the service 11 Thus there was no want of substantive authority• 
for the dismissal, and since Vitarelli was not in a "sensitive 
position", he was not entitled to a hearing .before a Loyalty-Security 
Boardo The Supreme Court brazenly admitted that Vitarelli could have 
been summarily discharged/had the Secretary of the Interior chosen 
to do so. It justified the order of reinstatement to the Department 
of or /and the payment of $30,000 /on the ground that 
because theA the grounds on which he 
was being discharged--notification of which he was not entitled in 
the first instance--the employee was entitled to all of the procedural 
requirements of someone in a 11 sensitive 
) 
11 position. Mr. President, 
it is an impossibility to deprive a person of procedural due process/ 
unless he is entitled to it in the fir~t instance. By its own 
admission, the Supreme Court recognized that .Vitarelli was not 
entitled to procedural due process/in this case. The rationale by 
which the Court reached the conclusion/that this security risk must 
be afforded all of the procedural requirements of one in a sensitive , 
position/is typical of its rationalizations in other cases/dealing 
with those who would overthrow our form of government. 
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Lest there be any doubt that he was exercising his authority/ 
to summarily dismiss a subordinate in the Department of Interior, 
the Secretary expunged the Department's records / or any reference to 
the Communist activity of Mr. Vitarelli, and notified him of his 
dismissal in October, 1956, omitting all reference to any statute, 
order, or regulation relating to security discharge s. There is no 
question whatever, Mr. President, that the Secretary of the Interior 
had the authority to summarily dismiss this employee, for whatever 
cause he saw fit, and in a manner that saw him removed from the 
ranks of Government employees / at the earliest possible opportunity. 
However, the Supreme Court, in a marvelous display of judicial 
gymnastics, held otherwise. A majority of the Court said /that 
because the 1954 dismissal was abortive, no effect would be given 
to the 1956 dismissal, notwithstanding the fact that ~·~A;;:;~=~ 
~~ ~c:,11.,r\~ ..(J..>o.' , ~ 
the letter ofAexercise of theLs ry dis ssal power. Even i~ it 
be conceded that the discharge of 1954 was invalid, the prior action 
did not deprive the Secretary/ or the power to fire Vitarelli 
prospectivelyo It was a lawful exercise of the summary dismissal 
power, and the Supreme Court held that it meant, administratively, 
nothing. The Court has frustrated every attempt of the Interior 
Department/to rid itself of this undesired employee. @ has af~~ 
has 
On Monday of this week, the Supreme Court said that not only has 
Vitarelli not been validly discharged, but that he is entitled to 
back pay of $30,000. How is the Federal Government to rid itself 
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of subversive elements within its very ranks? 
Typical of its opinions in recent years, Mr. President, the 
Supreme Court has once again disregarded the actualities of the 
situation. The power of the Executive to discharge for 
untrustworthiness or deliberate misrepresentation is beyond dispute. 
The Secretary of the Interior had unfettered authority to summarily 
dismiss William Vincent Vitarelli~ and did so, only to have this 
authority frustrated by the Court. In doing so, it gratuitously 
transformed itself into a fact-finding body, criticising the 
substance of the charges against Vitarelli / and the form of the 
questions propounded at the security hearing. It is not the function 
of the Supreme Court/ to decide whether an employee is or is not 
untrustworthy, or a "security risk". Vitarelli v. Seaton is another 
example of an unreal interpretation by the Supreme Court /resulting 
in disproportionate concern for Communist sympathizers /and the 
attribution of illegality to a lawful exercise of governmental 
action. 
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